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Introduction 
According to several observers, the emergence and proliferation of certification devices aimed 
at establishing social and environmental good practices in a given sector of activity represent 
one of the main institutional and political innovations of recent years (Cashore, Auld and 
Newsome, 2004). There is very little doubt that these initiatives, for the most implemented in 
the name of sustainable development, represent an essential component of its political 
dimension.  
In certain respects, they may appear as a form of privatisation of public policies (Graz and 
Nölke, 2007; Fouilleux, 2009) insofar as they essentially rely on non-state actors (firms and 
NGOs) which cooperate to produce rules and establish mechanisms to control their 
application. From this standpoint, their development marks a break with the methods of 
producing norms which, throughout “the long twentieth century” (Arrighi, 1994, Daviron, 
2008), were the prerogative of the public authorities. 
 
At the heart of these new forms of transnational authority we observe what certain authors 
have referred to as the “NGO-Industry Complex” (Gereffi, Garcia-Johnson, Sasser, 2001). 
While this new coupling illustrates the increasingly important role of non-state actors in 
global policy, the relationship between the latter and the public authorities is nevertheless 
more complex than the traditional doxa concerning the withdrawal of the state might lead us 
to believe. In large part, the transfer of normative competences to the private sector was 
encouraged and organised by the states themselves – within the framework of liberalisation 
policies –, by international organisations (see in particular the role played by the OECD in 
disseminating private standards) or by communities of states (such as the European Union). 
Moreover, the European Union has made the exportation of these normative mechanisms one 
of the vectors of expanding its international influence (Laidi, 2008). Even more explicitly, 
however, it is the United Nations, through the initiatives2 launched by the former Secretary 
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General Kofi Annan, which has contributed to the international legitimisation of the “NGO-
Industry Complex” as a vector of the international socialization of sustainable development. 
 
 
The certification devices introduced in the name of sustainable development in such sectors of 
activity as the agri-food, forestry, textiles and mining industries etc. present some common 
characteristics in addition to the simple fact of being designed within the framework of a 
partnership between firms and NGOs. 
 
First, these initiatives give rise to methods of governance aimed at encouraging the 
involvement of parties beyond the economic operators in the value chain. An important part 
of their operations involves developing and refining the procedures of participation, dialogue 
and deliberation, thus making the procedural dimension one of their major characteristics.  
Second, they are built around a political rationality geared towards solving a specific problem 
which initially confronts the parties directly concerned. The procedure governing the 
construction of the partnership therefore involves both the exploration of the means of solving 
the problem and the consensual establishment of rules. This “pragmatic” approach to 
problem-solving and the desire for consensus are central to the political rationality of these 
initiatives which we will re-examine later in this article. It should nevertheless be noted that 
this approach gives rise to a fragmentation of the means of solving problems (and thus the 
proliferation of certification initiatives) whereas the problems are often the same (solving the 
environmental and social problems linked to the expansion of predatory agricultural, mining 
or industrial activities). For example, instead of envisaging a common standard governing 
agro-industrial activities, we witness a proliferation of standards applying to agricultural 
products (coffee, tea, bananas, sugar cane, soy, palm oil etc.) despite the fact that some of the 
actors in the value chains (in particular the agri-food industries, the distributors, the banks 
which finance these activities) and the international NGOs involved are often the same.  
Third, in addition to solving the problems for which they are designed, these certification 
initiatives also attempt to become institutionalised and to impose themselves as regulatory 
instruments. To this end, they endeavour to enrol as many actors from the industries as 
possible (in particular producers). It is then possible to mobilise the parties directly concerned 
by means of mechanisms for defining principles and criteria (governing the methods of 
responsible production) founded on learning, the gradual adoption of standards and adaptation 
to the national contexts as a transition phase to the full and comprehensive application of 
generic standards. A final common characteristic of these initiatives is that they are founded 
on the authority of the “markets” as the final arbiter of “good practices” (Cashore, 2002). The 
need to distinguish virtuous firms from the others explains the important role accorded to the 
procedures of traceability, control and certification. The credibility of the certification also 
relies on the fact that it is produced by an independent third party acting as an agent of trust 
for the end consumer. 
 
In light of these characteristics, the certification initiatives are designated as private 
instruments of transnational governance3. To document the conditions of their emergence and 
their current proliferation, recent studies have looked beyond the simplistic functionalist 
explanation, which sees these private initiatives as an institutional response born of the need 
for regulation in a context of the globalisation of economic activities and the inability of states 
to rise to the challenge. 
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A first group of works emphasises the impetus provided by multinational companies which 
develop proactive strategies with a view to avoiding or neutralising the contestation of the 
social movements (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000, Haufler, 2003) or to transforming the 
symbolic capital of reputation into a competitive advantage (Potoski and Prakash, 2005; 
Funchs and Vogelmann, 2007). In light of this approach focusing on institutional emergence 
as a means of solving market problems, another perspective tends to emphasise the weight of 
political dynamics in devising these private instruments of regulation (Bartley, 2007). In the 
field of social sciences4, these approaches echo the works of Karl Polanyi (1983) on the social 
and political embeddedness of the market and their reworking by the American proponents of 
the “New Economic Sociology” (Granovetter, 1985; Fligstein, 1996). The works resulting 
from this approach emphasise the increasing role and political clout of the social movements 
which tend to adopt the structure of an international civil society. Their capacity for 
organisation and mobilisation (in particular through the development of communication 
networks) and their slow development from a role of contestation, enabled them to 
accompany the mutation of certain non-governmental organisations into genuine political 
entrepreneurs (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Fiorini, 2000). To a certain extent, by incorporating 
moral, social justice and environmental concerns, the NGOs contribute to a political 
embeddedness of the market. 
 
Without calling into question the principle of a social and political setting of the market, we 
nevertheless feel that this approach aimed at opposing the attitudes of non-state actors and 
defining the certification initiatives as figures of compromise between antagonist world 
visions, is founded on the assumption of an insurmountable divide between firms and NGOs. 
However, in the push towards the “professionalization” of numerous international NGOs, 
certain aspects are singularly overlooked, in particular concerning the adoption of managerial 
and accounting practices which are equally as good as those of the firms and the development 
of recruitment profiles from the same schools making the interchangeability of the careers of 
militants and corporate executives or even top civil servants in ministerial cabinets possible 
(Dezalay and Garth 2005). One of the main consequences for our analysis is that, more often 
than we might like to believe, the representatives of multinational companies and international 
NGOs share a common repertoire facilitating dialogue. Some of these NGOs – in particular 
those which are most engaged in promoting certification initiatives as the main instrument for 
disseminating the principles of sustainable development – therefore share the corporate belief 
in the self-regulating capacity of the market. 
 
Distancing itself somewhat from these approaches, the aim of this text is to suggest focal 
points for the analysis of how, in the name of sustainable development, the partnerships 
between international NGOs and multinational firms govern the international circulation of 
political rationalities and specific technologies of government. Our hypothesis is that these 
political rationalities are based on a managerial repertoire. 
  
 Managerialism as a technology of government 
 
The term “managerialism” has emerged in recent years to designate this collection of 
knowledge and practices initially intended for corporate management and systematically 
aiming to increase the efficiency of collective action irrespective of the object or the entity 
concerned (Townley 2002). The main characteristic of managerialism is therefore a set of 
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techniques which, when implemented, are supposed to be universal in nature and can be 
adopted by any organisation.  
 
In a managerialised organisation, the management itself becomes the central objective, the 
most important question. Instrumental rationality becomes necessary. The organisation has 
clear goals distinct from the means which will be selected according to their efficiency. On 
this basis, regular evaluations will allow the action to be improved constantly. Furthermore, 
the managerialised organisation views itself and others as actors endowed with agency. As 
Aghamanoukjan et al (2007: 6) underlined, “In fact, instrumental and agency are two sides of 
the same coin: active, autonomous and responsible agents only become imaginable in a 
rationalized world, where the agency that was originally located in transcendental authority 
or natural forces becomes relocated in modern actors”. 
 
One of the major events of the past twenty five years lies in the extension of the scopes of 
application of corporate management. As a result, we have witnessed a migration of its 
constituent rationalities and practices towards the public sector, the non-profit sector and 
international NGOs. The British “New Public Management” and its famous slogan 
“Economy, Efficiency, Effectiveness” is a striking illustration of this dissemination of 
managerialism (Ferlie 1996; Pollitt and Bouackaert, 2004; Le Gales and Scott 2008). New 
Public Management is located far beyond recurrent state reform projects: it takes it as 
axiomatic that the technologies of private corporate management are the most efficient 
solutions to the problems raised by administrative management (Dardot and Laval, 2009). 
 
As illustrated by Boltanski and Chiapello (1999), this dissemination of a managerial model 
prioritising the autonomy, initiative and responsibility of individuals with a view to improving 
individual and collective performances results from a dual transformation: on the one hand 
that of capitalism itself, as characterised by the decline of the hierarchical models of Fordist 
organisation to be replaced by new forms of networked labour organisation; and on the other 
hand that of the management techniques which evolve and re-appropriate the repertoire of 
intellectual and social criticism from the prior organisation of labour, considered to be 
somewhat alienating. These ideological changes in management help us to understand its 
dissemination, in particular within organisations founded on philosophies of action and 
cultures hostile towards hierarchy. They contribute to documenting the conditions which may 
have facilitated the connections between the corporate world and the NGOs. 
Nevertheless, the main limitation of the analyses of Boltanski and Chiapello is that they 
emphasise the ideological changes in management to the detriment of an analysis of the 
specific effects of the instruments implemented. 
 
At this level, the works of Michel Foucault on governmentality and technologies of power 
remain among the most interesting. 
As we know, the notion of governmentality highlights in particular a radical transformation in 
the forms of exercising power which is reflected in the relations between the forms of 
knowledge, the balance of power and the processes of subjectivisation (Foucault, 2001; 
2004a). Foucault illustrates how political rationalities emerging from the second half of the 
18th century were founded on systems of knowledge and government measures which 
subsequently applied to the notion of “population”, described as a set of resources and needs. 
Through this notion of governmentality, he then analysed the rise of liberalism and neo-
liberalism as methods of government situated beyond the “Reason of State” which had 
prevailed until then, founded on knowledge and techniques aimed at limiting the 
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governmental action and adjusting it to the “natural” market mechanisms (Foucault, 2004 b). 
This development was accompanied by new disciplinary conceptions which would replace the 
traditional forms of authority based on hierarchical command, by techniques of orienting 
individuals, thereby enabling their conduct to be governed at a distance (Miller & Rose, 1990; 
Lascoumes, 2004). 
In this paper, it is most particularly his approach to the problems of power and his concept of 
“technology of power” which command our attention. Foucault rejects an essentialist, legal or 
negative concept of power. In his opinion, these new types of power “in no way have the 
primordial function of prohibiting, preventing or saying “you must not”. The original, 
essential and permanent function of these powers (...) is, in reality, to produce efficiency and 
aptitude among the producers of a product” (2001: 1006). Consequently, these “mechanisms 
of power must be considered as techniques, i.e. as procedures which have been invented and 
perfected and are constantly evolving. There is a genuine technology of power or, even better, 
of powers which have their own history” (2001: 1008). 
 
Managerialism understood in this perspective is a technology of power which aims to manage 
conduct, and its dissemination in the sphere of public administration is simply an avatar of the 
broader process of “governmentalising the state” demonstrated by Foucault (2004 a: 112). We 
also purposely adopt the notion of “device” (in French “dispositif”) to designate the institution 
which we will analyse in this article. As G. Agamben (2007: 28) recalls with reference to 
Foucault’s usages, the notion of device refers to “a set of practices, knowledge, measures and 
institutions” the aim of which is to manage, govern, control and guide – in what claims to be 
a useful sense – the behaviour, acts and thoughts of people”. 
 
Among the technologies of government disseminated by new management, auditing 
procedures play a particular role and have been the subject of numerous works continuing the 
now famous study of M. Power (1997). The audit has become the archetype of an instrument 
conveying an implicit theorisation of the world imposing on all sectors the management 
rationalities of the field of accounting within which it was conceived (Strathern, 2000). In a 
previous document, we extended these analyses to present a study of the first audits conducted 
in the production units applying for RSPO certification (Djama & Verwilhgen, 2009). At the 
same time, we provide an analysis of the managerial techniques implemented to accompany 
the definition of the RSPO standard and to organise the interactions between the stakeholders 
participating in the process5. 
We will attempt to demonstrate that these managerial techniques aim not so much to facilitate 
debate as to neutralise controversies. 
 
Institutionalising palm oil certification 
 
In 2001, the Swiss office of the WWF (formerly the World Wildlife Fund, now the World 
Wide Fund for Nature) commissioned a consultant to identify opportunities for developing 
partnerships with industrialists with a view to implementing sustainable criteria in the 
production of palm oil. This consultant, a former professor of management in a Dutch 
university, left higher education to create a consultancy firm specialising in the construction 
of partnerships for sustainable development bringing together NGOs and firms, in particular 
in the agri-food sector. 
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The palm oil production chain has for a number of years been called into question by non-
governmental organisations which criticise its negative externalities, primarily its expansion 
to the detriment of the primary forests of South-East Asia, the erosion of biodiversity, the 
threats to endangered species such as orang-utans, whose habitats have been destroyed, and 
the expropriation by plantation firms of communities living on land coveted by these 
companies. 
 
The vast majority of palm oil (more than 80% of production) is produced by two countries in 
South-East Asia: Indonesia and Malaysia. Palm oil is a strategic raw material in the agri-food 
industry. It is estimated that almost half of all processed food products contain palm oil. 
Thanks to its yield per hectare and its inherent properties which facilitate its transformation or 
its incorporation in various food solutions, it has become the most widely produced vegetable 
oil in the world, accounting for 30% of the edible oil market. The European market represents 
approximately 16% of consumption compared to about 55% on the Asian markets. Moreover, 
the applications of palm oil go beyond the food industry as it is also used in cosmetics, while 
a new opportunity is developing in relation to the production of biofuels. Due to the rise in 
world food demand, the growth of solvent markets (in particular in Asia and Eastern Europe) 
and potential opportunities in the biofuel sector, all the actors in the value chain forecast 
strong growth in production (about twice the current production by 2020 according to 
estimations), implying increased pressure on resources and the environment. The WWF 
initiative was founded on this diagnostic of probable growth in world palm oil demand in an 
attempt, together with other actors in the value chain, to identify the means of limiting the 
environmental and social impacts. 
 
Following the request from the WWF, the consultant organised an initial meeting in London 
in 2002, during which the representatives of the downstream industries (distributors, 
processors and users of palm oil), private and European development banks, consultancy 
firms specialising in the environment and the WWF (the only conservationist NGO present) 
sketched the outlines of a collaboration aimed at promoting sustainable development in this 
sector. 
Examined in detail, this initial contact meeting defined the guiding principles of the future 
“initiative on sustainable palm oil”: promoting “practical”, “viable” and “controllable” 
sustainability criteria and expressing a “pragmatic” solution based on commercial 
imperatives. These standards had to be developed through an approach involving all the 
stakeholders and designed to encourage a common understanding of the sustainability criteria 
among them. The principle of organising a multi-stakeholder roundtable to define a 
sustainable production standard for palm oil was adopted. 
A first concern was nevertheless voiced at this inaugural meeting: the meeting only included 
the European components of the industry (distribution and consumer industries) together with 
the banks, while no representative of the producers was present. The participants felt it 
important to bridge this gap between the producers and the other players in the chain which 
also reflected a geographical North-South divide, giving the impression that the initiative was 
governed by European interests. 
 
In subsequent weeks, contact was made with the Malaysian Palm Oil Association (MPOA) 
which represented the main Malaysian palm oil-producing conglomerates, which are the 
world leaders in production. While the initiative undertaken by the WWF and the European 
industrialists was a private sector affair with a “business to business” rationale, the close and 
paradoxical ties maintained by the Malaysian conglomerates with the public authorities 
without doubt played a key role in the development of the RSPO. The rise of the palm oil 
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industry in Malaysia during the 1970s and the 1980s was indeed inextricably linked to the 
policy of economic nationalism at the heart of the “New Economic Policy” programme (NEP) 
which accompanied the industrial modernisation of the country. During this period, the 
Malaysian state bought up and merged most of the foreign plantation firms established in the 
country, before organising their gradual transfer to a Malaysian economic elite (Jomo & al. 
2004; Gustafsson, 2007). While some of the conglomerates have since been privatised, the 
largest companies are still controlled by public capital and the links of patronage which 
remain between the political and industrial spheres in this strategic economic sector (Gomez, 
2002) give an idea of the role of Malaysian public authorities in an initiative which does not 
explicitly include the states. It would seem certain that the Malaysian authorities gave 
political support to the RSPO initiative. 
Despite the reluctance of certain factions hostile to the idea of dialogue with the NGOs, the 
representatives of the MPOA bought into the initiative. Their motivation can be traced to the 
competitive rationales governing the vegetable oil sector. During the 1980s, Malaysian palm 
oil producers had had to develop advocacy, defence and lobbying procedures in an industrial 
and commercial conflict pitting them against American (USA) soy industrialists. This conflict 
was reflected in particular by an American anti-palm oil campaign founded on health and 
danger considerations concerning palm oils. At a time when palm oil production was 
experiencing great difficulty in establishing itself on the world vegetable oils markets, the risk 
of a new boycott incited by the campaigns of environmental NGOs had to be neutralised. For 
some, the introduction of a standard certifying the sustainable production of palm oil even 
seemed to provide a competitive advantage over soy production which was stigmatised by the 
NGOs due to the expansion of crops based on genetically modified seeds6.  
The mobilisation of the MPOA facilitated the enrolment of Indonesian professional 
organisations (in particular the GAPKI, the Indonesian equivalent of MPOA) and 
representatives of the planters in South-East Asia and other production regions. 
 
At the beginning of 2003, the organising committee of the first RSPO was created comprising 
the WWF, the European industrialists from the first meeting and the MPOA. The Dutch 
consultant initially mandated by the WWF was entrusted with the role of facilitating the 
meeting while the consultancy firm Proforest, specialising in sustainable resource 
management and also present at the inaugural meeting in London in 2002, was appointed as 
the expert to present the main elements of the criteria to be taken into consideration for 
sustainable palm oil production and to chair the technical discussions. 
 
 
In August 2003, less than two years after the WWF initiative, the first Roundtable for 
Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) was organised in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. For the first time, 
this roundtable brought together the stakeholders7 in an attempt to qualify sustainable palm 
oil.  
This first roundtable resulted in a reiteration of the objectives of the roundtable, approved by 
all the parties concerned: 
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“The goal is to promote the growth and use of sustainably produced palm oil through 
co-operation within the palm oil chain and open dialogue with its stakeholders. This is 
a platform for pragmatic co-operation to contribute to the expansion of sustainably 
produced palm oil”. 
 
Forty participants agreed to a joint declaration to implement and promote a sustainable 
standard for the production of palm oil. 
 
At the start of 2004, the RSPO adopted the status of an association in Swiss law with its head 
office in Zurich, a secretariat in Malaysia and a liaison office in Indonesia. A governance 
mechanism was established, coordinated by an Executive Board comprising 16 member 
elected for two years and representing the stakeholders. 
 
 
Sector Number of seats 
Oil palm growers 4  8 
Palm oil processors and/or traders 2 
Consumer goods manufacturers 2 
Retailers 2 
Banks / investors 2 
Environmental / nature conservation 
NGO’s 
2 
Social / development NGOs 2 
 
The Executive Board examines the dossiers, implements the orientations decided in the 
plenary meetings, organises the working groups and manages the finances. The orientations of 
the programme are adopted in the plenary meetings during an annual general assembly to 
which all members are invited. These members have the opportunity – prior to the general 
meeting – to submit a motion on which a vote will be held. 
 
Since the first roundtable in 2003 (RT1), six annual roundtables and five general meetings 
have been organised to date. 
RT2 in 2004 launched the process of defining the principles and criteria; RT3 in 2005 adopted 
the principles and criteria and implemented a two-year pilot phase for their empirical 
validation following tests with volunteer firms; RT4 and 5 (2006 and 2007) implemented the 
procedures for the control and audit of the principles and criteria by a third party and 
undertook discussions both on how to take account of smallholders and on the adaptation of 
the generic principles and criteria to the national contexts; RT 6 (2008) validated the 
sustainable palm oil certification mechanisms. To date, 11 RSPO certificates have been issued 
to companies. 
 
In this light, the RSPO initiative would appear to be a success story or an example of the 
institutionalisation of a certification mechanism, as described by Bernstein and Cashore 
(2007). In the space of a few years, the RSPO has succeeded in instituting a complete 
regulation cycle, from the establishment of the rules to the definition of the control and 
traceability procedures for the products certified. 
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At the same time, membership of the RSPO continues to grow – the sign of increasing 
success, in particular with the planters and industrialists. Finally, the RSPO still faces no 
competition from an alternative standard. 
 
This rapid institutionalisation of the RSPO can be explained by a combination of factors, 
including the type of organisation of the value chain – in particular the relatively limited 
number of industrial operators and the geographical concentration of the production zones, the 
high level of guidance given to the planters in the professional organisations and the 
considerable economic and political weight of the conglomerates which dominate the sector 
etc. 
 
In the following pages, we will focus on another dimension which helps to explain the 
changes experienced by the RSPO, resulting both from the guidance provided by a small 
consortium of industrialists, NGOs and technical experts and from the emphasis placed on 
managerial rationality which prioritises the dissemination of a common vision of sustainable 
development, in an attempt to identify consensual points while neutralising disputes. 
 
Managerial rationalities in establishing the standard 
 
Roughly speaking, the multi-stakeholder initiatives present themselves as forums for 
negotiation bringing together individuals and groups of operators defending a number of 
different – or even opposing – interests, but demonstrating a common will to solve a problem. 
Their legitimacy lies on a dual internal and external remit (Bäckstrand, 2006): internal insofar 
as they are based on procedures aimed at guaranteeing a strong representation of the parties 
concerned, transparency of discussion and forms of accountability; and external in that they 
effectively contribute to solving the problem for which they were created. A positive vision of 
these initiatives highlights the role of dispute or the confrontation of points of view in 
exploring a complex phenomenon and as a decision-making aid (Callon, Lascoumes & 
Barthes, 2001).  
While the RSPO enjoys a growing membership of stakeholders (including NGOs), the 
analysis of the process also highlights other aspects, in particular the dominant role of a small  
consortium of NGOs, firms and consultants in formatting the debates, imposing a vision and 
governing the process, despite the rhetoric supporting inclusion and participation. 
 
 Producing meaning 
 
The principles and criteria which represent the architecture of the RSPO standard were not 
established ex-nihilo or within the framework of the “Criteria Working Group” (CWG) which 
was created in the wake of the first roundtable. The process called on the experiences and 
expertise capitalised on by a small group of operators who initiated the process. 
As early as 1998, the firm Unilever defined indicators of sustainable palm oil production 
which it would test through pilot projects on its plantations or through a number of its 
suppliers. At the same time, it informed the actors in the value chain of its approaches, in 
particular the MPOA in Malaysia. This dialogue between Unilever and MPOA on the 
indicators of sustainability would facilitate the inclusion of the latter in the organisation of the 
first roundtable in 2003. 
 
Elsewhere, at the start of new millennium, the Swiss retailer Migros also developed a 
programme for defining the criteria for the sustainability of palm oil which it intended to 
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impose on its suppliers. In order to implement this programme and give it legitimacy, Migros 
armed itself with the expertise of the WWF – to establish the criteria – and of ProForest – to 
monitor the implementation and inspect the suppliers. 
The criteria defined by the WWF and ProForest on behalf of Migros were based on the 
experiences that these two organisations had gained from the “Forest Stewardship Council”, 
the pioneer of forestry certification, adapting them to the technical operating conditions of the 
palm oil plantations. The Migros standard established the basic principles which would be 
adopted by the RSPO (transparency, compliance with the laws, agricultural good practices, 
environmental and social criteria). It also defined an action plan based on generic criteria to 
formulate mechanisms for adapting to the local contexts and encourage learning to help 
accompany the measures ensuring the respect of the standards on the part of suppliers which 
did not comply with the criteria. 
 
During the inaugural meeting held in London in September 2002, Unilever, Migros, the WWF 
and ProForest shared feedback from their respective programmes with the other participants. 
Because it had enjoyed the technical expertise of the WWF and ProForest, the standard 
developed by Migros commanded considerable attention, in particular because its criteria took 
account of the thorny problem of forests conversion. 
The feedback from the Migros standard led the participants to anticipate and rank the 
questions to be dealt with in a multi-stakeholder roundtable: how to tackle the links between 
the expansion of palm oil and deforestation, the two elements at the heart of the conflicts 
between NGOs and industry? How to develop standards which take account of biodiversity? 
Which certification and traceability mechanisms should be adopted? How should the roles be 
shared between the actors in the value chain? 
These questions were examined by this small group of RSPO initiators before the first 
roundtables were organised.  
As a result, even if the success of the RSPO initiative remained highly uncertain at this phase, 
it would appear with hindsight that this inaugural meeting held in London in 2002 in the 
absence of the producers and the NGOs from the South, sketched the outlines of both the 
RSPO standard and the strategy facilitating its dissemination among the stake-holders. The 
objectives of the roundtable, the questions to be tackled and even the solution to be provided 
(through the Migros standard) had already been defined. All that remained was to concentrate 
the majority of the efforts on the procedures and the methodologies for coordinating and 
managing the groups. It is here that the knowhow of the consultants came into play, all the 
more so as the WWF-Unilever-Migros consortium which initiated the procedure all agreed 
that the questions on the agenda should give rise to a moderate discussion between the parties 
concerned with a view to obtaining a minimum consensus. 
 
 Governing by consensus 
 
The preamble to a document on the method of developing the RSPO standard prepared by the 
consultancy firm ProForest9 states that: 
 
“The development of standards is a complex and specialist task and should be co-
ordinated by a facilitator. The facilitator should ideally have experience of facilitation 
together with a credible understanding of oil palm and direct experience of developing 
criteria for natural resource management.” 
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February 2004  (p.6) 
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Organising and coordinating the roundtables and establishing the standards is based on the 
engineering of facilitation promoted by consultants whose main competence lies in their 
ability to encourage dialogue between the stakeholders. More precisely, the facilitation work 
of the experts in the RSPO process consisted of establishing the technical frameworks of the 
debate and translating the orientation of the programme among the stakeholders. From the vey 
outset of the initiative, we have witnessed the role of intermediary played by these consultants 
in the procedure – through the task of identifying the industrial partners entrusted by the 
WWF to a consultant or the involvement of the consultancy firm ProForest. The latter – 
ProForest – was to play a pivotal role in producing the RSPO standard. ProForest is a 
consultancy firm founded in 2000 with its head office in Oxford. It specialises in the 
implementation of sustainable development strategy and the “responsible” management of 
natural resources, in particular in the forestry and agri-food sectors as well as in the field of 
conservation. 
The founders of ProForest were heavily involved in developing the criteria for the FSC 
forestry certification. In the palm oil sector, ProForest obtained an initial appraisal by 
conducting the supplier audits for Migros. The director of ProForest was present at the 
inaugural meeting held in London in 2002 which launched the RSPO process. 
In 2003, the organising committee of the first roundtable10 commissioned two studies from 
ProForest, one concerning the debates on the relations between deforestation and the 
expansion of the palm oil plantations (the issue) and the other concerning the mechanisms for 
establishing the sustainable palm oil production standards (the solutions). In preparing these 
documents, ProForest relied on its own experience in the forestry sector, the Migros criteria 
and the audits it conducted on behalf of Migros. It also collected the information and opinions 
of a network of actors in the agri-food industries11. 
 
For the parties who commissioned this study, ProForest presented a dual profile of neutrality: 
on the one hand, this consultancy firm was supposed to have no industrial interests in the 
palm oil sector while on the other hand, its technical expertise enabled it to provide 
“objective” information enabling the heatedness to be removed from the debates. 
 
The dialogue between industry and the NGOs was, in practice, organised through the 
intervention of these consultancy firms whose members were generally from the 
environmental conservation sphere, sometimes with a militant past, and were encouraged by 
the rise of the sustainable development market to convert to industrial compromise and the 
identification of “practical solutions”. 
During RT1 (August 2003), ProForest chaired two discussion groups, one dealing with the 
links between deforestation and the expansion of the palm oil plantations and the other 
examining the definition of the sustainability of palm oil production. From February to March 
2004, it circulated a document12 among the members of the temporary RSPO board presenting 
a first draft of the standard (i.e. the principles and criteria)13 and a methodology for pursuing 
their development in a multi-stakeholder framework. A discussion ensued between ProForest 
                                                 
10
 The organising committee consisted of the WWF (only NGO), the firms Anglia Oils, Migros, Sainsbury, 
Unilever, Golden Hope and the MPOA. 
11
 ProForest relied in part on the appraisals produced by the Sustainable Agriculture Initiative, created in 2002 
by the firms Danone, Nestlè and Unilever and which includes twenty firms. The aim of this network is to 
conduct research and promote the dissemination of agricultural good practices. 
12
 ProForest “Discussion paper on the development of criteria to define sustainable palm oil” (op.cit. 2004). 
13
 The terms “standard”, “principles and criteria” and “criteria” appear to be interchangeable in the usage of the 
RSPO participants. In their “Discussion paper” (op.cit., 2004) ProForest used the term standard, but a proposed 
correction was introduced by one of the parties who read the first draft and suggested replacing the term 
“standard” by “criteria”. 
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and the members of the board concerning the composition and operating principles of a 
Criteria Working Group (CWG) responsible for discussing the criteria proposed by ProForest. 
It was agreed that the CWG would consist of 25 members including representatives of all the 
parties concerned. One of the key points concerned the decision-making process within this 
CWG. ProForest emphasised the need for decisions taken by consensus in order to facilitate 
the acceptance of the decision by all stakeholders14.  
 
In practice, the main orientations of ProForest – both with regard to the approach and the 
content of the proposed standard – were approved by the interim Executive Board and the 
CWG. The latter was formally created in September 2004 with 25 members selected by the 
interim Executive Board to reflect the representation of the stakeholders: 
 
- 10 representatives of the producers 
- 5 representatives of the industries and investors 
- 5 representatives of the environmental NGOs  
- 5 representatives of the social NGOs 
 
The mission of the CWG was to define the principles and criteria over a period of 12 months 
in accordance with a “transparent” and “public” procedure. 
With this in mind, two physical meetings of the members were scheduled together with a 
public consultation phase15. 
 
The format of this deliberative procedure – in particular the very limited time allocated to the 
CWG to define the standard – neutralised controversies and encouraged the participants to 
concentrate on the points of the proposal formulated by the technical consultant who produced 
the information and who also “facilitated” and “chaired” the discussion. For the stakeholders, 
it was less a case of debating than evaluating the operationality of the criteria presented to 
them and the incorporation of the interests they represented. 
 
As one participant in the CWG summed up:  
 
“We globally approved the proposals of ProForest. Our task was to work towards a 
consensus. If we hadn’t succeeded in obtaining a consensus, we would have voted. I 
don’t know how we did it, but we always avoided the vote.”16 
 
Consensus here is a crucial element of managerial dynamics at work in the RSPO. It was the 
main mechanism facilitating the ownership of the standard and the construction of the NGO-
Industry Complex. It was made possible by the mobilisation of neutral intermediaries – 
neutral in that they appeared to have no links to any of the parties concerned and the 
credibility of which lay both in their past history, which made them aware of the social and 
environmental objectives, and in their expertise, which enabled them to make these objectives 
operational as criteria which could be handled by the plantation administrators. 
                                                 
14
 “Decisions of the Criteria Wrking Group should be made by consensus. Although this is perhaps the most 
difficult and time-consuming system, it is a process that leads to greater ownership of decisions by all 
stakeholders.” (op.cit., 7) 
15
 The first meeting of the CWG was held in October 2004 prior to the opening of RT2 in Jakarta (Indonesia). 
The second meeting was held from 15th to 18th February 2005 in Malaysia. Between these two meetings, the 
members of the group communicated by e-mail. 
16
 Interview with JCJ, Bali (Indonesia), 16th November 2007. 
 13 
Consensus is an instrument of government insofar as it does not result from debate or 
negotiation (unlike compromise), instead having the effect of neutralising debate. As the 
philosopher Jacques Rancière (2007, 8) reminds us:  
 
“What consensus really means is not the agreement of people among themselves but 
the agreement of meaning with meaning: the agreement between a sensitive regime of 
presenting matters and a means of interpreting their meaning. The consensus which 
governs us is a machine of power just as it is a machine of vision. It claims only to 
observe what everyone can see by reconciling two proposals concerning the state of 
the world: one says that we are finally at peace while the other presents the condition 
of this peace: the recognition that there is only what there is.” 
 
Consensus therefore becomes a means of imposing a reality to which, in fine, we all accept. 
 
 Subordinating science to the imperatives of management 
 
One of the means by which a minimum consensus is obtained involves deferring the inclusion 
of the most hotly disputed points. This means removing them from the process of defining the 
standard and dealing with them in specialised committees organised in accordance with a 
balanced representation of the stakeholders. The formation of these working groups or 
technical committees17 is generally justified by the need to provide more data or scientific 
knowledge about the topic concerned. The plan therefore exists to increase the number of 
these specialised committees with a view to gradually developing or improving the standard.  
 
For example, a technical committee on biodiversity (Biodiversity Technical Committee) was 
created in 2009 for a period of two years with a view to improving the principles and criteria 
relating to the conservation of biodiversity. The aim of the committee is to put forward 
proposals for improvement based on the feedback from the first audits conducted in the 
plantations applying for RSPO certification18 as well as on the appraisals of the biodiversity 
administrative community (conservationist NGOs, private consultants, academics). The 
committee should also suggest research topics with a view to increasing knowledge on certain 
sensitive issues. The BTC is partially financed by a grant from the International Finance 
Corporation – an entity of the World Bank – through its “Biodiversity and Agricultural 
Commodities Programme”. 
 
While formally independent, the BTC would appear to be placed under the aegis of the RSPO 
Secretariat which is responsible for coordinating it. Within its thirteen members, the 
community of “conservationists” would seem to be underrepresented (two members). The 
latter see the BTC as a club under the influence of the RSPO Secretariat (of which the current 
director is an executive in the MPOA), which co-opted the scientists invited to participate. 
Eminent Malaysian researchers were called on by the Secretariat of the RSPO to contribute to 
the committee’s works, but in practice only one agreed to participate and neither he nor the 
co-opted Malaysian scientists participated in the two committee meetings held in April 2009 
(on the occasion of the launch of the BTC) and in June 2009. 
                                                 
17
 Several working groups or technical committees were created as a continuation of the Criteria Working Group 
with a view to dealing with certain disputed points in greater detail, including: National Implementation and 
Interpretation of P&C; Smallholders Task Force; Verification Working Group; Biodiversity Technical 
Committee; HCV-RSPO Indonesia Working Group; Greenhouse Gas Working Group; New Plantings Working 
Group etc. 
18
 The first RSPO audits were conducted in 2008.  
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 Composition of the Biodiversity Technical Committee (sources: www.rspo.org) 
 
Members College Function / Institution Training 
Henri Barlow Industry - Production Dir. Sime Darby DAF accountant 
Dr.Gan Lian Tiong Industry - Production Dir Musim Mas Management 
Chew Jit Seng Industry - Production Genting Plantation Management 
Purwo Susanto Industry - Production  Dir IPOC Agronomy 
Olivier Tichit Industry - Production Dir PT Tolan Tiga Agronomy 
Nobuo Nakanishi Industry – Consum. R&D Master of Arts 
Dr. Tom Maddox Conservation ZSL Dr. in biology 
Dr. Reza Azmi Conservation Dir Wild Asia Ecology 
Julie Flood Administration UK Dir CABI Plant pathology 
Catherine Cassagne Financial - banking IFC HEC 
Prof Yong Hoi Sen Academic Prof de Genetic UM Genetic  
Jutta Poetz RSPO secretariat Coordinator 
Biodiversity 
Genetic  
Sarala Aikanathan RSPO secretariat Communication Biology 
 
To escape what they perceived as the stranglehold of the Secretariat of the RSPO and its 
industrial interests on the process, a certain number of conservationist NGOs adopted a 
strategy of forum shifting, preferring to submit research projects directly in response to the 
calls for tender from the BACP, or to develop local alliances with voluntary firms to test 
biodiversity conservation strategies rather than committing to the BTC19. For their part, the 
coordinators of the BTC emphasised the fact that this committee is a forum open to all well-
intentioned people providing an opportunity for dialogue which the “conservationists” refused 
to seize20. 
 
Reading the minutes of the BTC meetings nevertheless gives an idea of the different 
expectations of the stakeholders as well as the orientations imposed by the industrialists, as 
illustrated in the following extract21: 
 
a conservationist: “suggests a review of existing papers/plans for riparian zones” 
the chairperson of the BTC, a former plantation manager answers: we have to 
consider “immediate action without the need for a review/framework approach and 
only methodologies/recipes/instructions on how to manage”. 
 
In the organisation of the RSPO, the technical committees are designed as forums for 
developing dispute, the production of data and the construction of suitable solutions based on 
the production of knowledge. In practice, as we can see, incorporating issues concerning the 
conservation of biodiversity is subject to the imperatives of producing “practical” and 
operational short-term solutions. Despite the references to scientific or technical 
rationalisation which represent one of the cornerstones of the legitimacy of standards, 
academic or scientific knowledge has no real place in these processes and gives rise to 
constant mistrust on the part of the industrialists. 
                                                 
19
 Interview R. Kuala Lumpur, 3rd November 2009; interview T. Kuala Lumpur, 3rd November 2009. 
20
 Interview JP Kuala Lumpur, 2nd November 2009 
21
 Minutes of the 2nd Biodiversity Technical Committee (BTC) meeting, 13th June, 2009, Jakarta. 
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From the preparation phase of the standards, the role of scientists in the process has been open 
to discussion: the consultants at ProForest suggested the possibility of appointing scientists or 
technical experts to help the stakeholders to develop the standard. This proposal immediately 
gave rise to fears and was opposed by certain initiators of the process who saw in the 
scientists’ contribution the risk of criteria being produced which were neither “practical” nor 
“economically feasible”22. 
 
These reactions are characteristic of a form of neo-liberal managerialism which, as M. 
Benassayag and I. del Rey (2007: 292) remind us, is founded on “the dictatorship of the 
immediate resolution of problems. In this way, we gradually, and without realising it, remove 
everything from society which requires time, maturation and experience. Anything that cannot 
be implemented immediately and requires a minimum level of complexity to be taken into 
account is quite simply rejected.” 
 
Conclusion: the circulation of managerial techniques 
 
Numerous works rightly examine the legitimacy of transnational certification initiatives such 
as the RSPO, or test their democratic rhetoric or their capacity to find an effective solution to 
the problems they address. 
By treating certification initiatives as technologies of government, the objective of this article 
was to study power strategies in a monographic perspective – in other words the 
correspondence between the finality of the stakeholders’ conduct of conducts, and the means 
of achieving it. We have attempted to highlight three means guiding the RSPO certification 
initiative. 
The first was the creation of a consortium bringing together European firms, a European NGO 
and a number of consultants to define the architecture of the standard and establish the 
operating rules of the initiative. The very nature of the consortium, combining industry and 
NGOs, was intended to signify that a pacification of the disputes concerning the production 
conditions of palm oil was possible. 
The second means was the dissemination of the standards through a technology of consensus 
building.  
The third means was founded on the management of disputed matters, through the 
implementation of procedures exploring the problems based on the production of knowledge 
while disqualifying the role of academic experts. 
Throughout the process, a managerial rationality was brought into play emphasising the 
concepts of “operationality”, “economic feasibility”, “pragmatism” and “short-term 
solutions”. 
 
Thanks to its transnational scope, the RSPO initiative contributes to ensuring the circulation 
of this managerial rationality and imposes its dissemination on all stakeholders, including 
those which (like the NGOs) were previously aligned with a more militant than managerial set 
of values. 
                                                 
22
 Cf. ProForest “Discussion paper …” (op.cit. p. 6): ProForest suggest that: “The Roundtable may need to 
nominate academic and technical support candidates, ensure sufficient representation by all groups and to make 
sure that forming the Criteria Working Group is done with sufficient speed.” Comment in reaction to this 
proposal: “need to be careful not to have too many academics as the proposed criteria must be as practical and 
economically feasible. The academic and the technical support groups should be involved in the R&D phase, on 
projects or gaps that are identified by the Criteria Working Group”. 
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In return, the circulation of this rationality contributes to the connections of firms and NGOs. 
For both international NGOs and large firms exposed to reputational risk, the convergence 
mechanisms were initiated independently of the RSPO. The rationale of professionalising the 
major international NGOs was probably the result of the increasingly complex nature of their 
missions, with large budgets, teams of employees and volunteers deployed throughout the 
world and increasingly diversified forms of activism. NGO activities are no longer simply a 
matter of “political entrepreneurship”; they are also a question of managing projects and 
resources in the same way as firms do. Even recruitment methods have become more 
diversified, accelerating the transformation of militants into professionals with a university 
education making the profiles of both figures interchangeable. 
 
Similarly, the sustainability market and the search for new motivations for their employees 
have forced many firms to undertake a restructuring process, creating dedicated departments 
or Corporate Social Responsibility projects. 
 
In South-East Asia, where most of the palm oil production is concentrated, RSPO certification 
is a vector of organisational change within the plantation firms. Hence, the conclusions of the 
first application tests for the RSPO “principles & criteria” presented at RT5, held in Kuala 
Lumpur in November 2007, emphasised the need for a department dedicated to the RSPO 
standardisation monitoring and communication procedure. The implementation of social and 
environmental impact studies, the identification of high-value conservation zones within the 
plantations or their immediate surroundings, the increasing number of audits etc. have created 
new markets of expertise, while the competences required in these fields have essentially been 
developed and capitalised on by NGOs or consultancy firms, such as ProForest.  
 
This results in the organisation of a genuine circulation of competences, from NGOs to firms, 
or the creation of consultancy firms at the joint initiative of the two entities. Several career 
paths of the members of the RSPO Executive Board illustrate this circulation of competences 
which contributes to fudging the boundaries between NGOs and industry irrespective of 
whether it is a question of the creation of a consultancy firm specialising in sustainable 
development as a subsidiary of a palm oil conglomerate bringing together a former 
representative of the WWF and a former representative of the planters within the Board; a 
palm oil conglomerate’s sustainable development policy chief joining a social enterprise 
specialising in conducting social and environmental audits; or the departure of an executive 
from Rabobank to work with the WWF. 
 
These examples, if they were to multiply, give us reason to believe that these certification 
initiatives have reconfigured or pacified the balance of power governing the confrontation 
between the NGOs and industry in the palm oil sector. The conflict – and thus politics – has 
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